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Abstract
The scale and asymmetry of commercial technology firms’ power over people through
data, combined with the increasing involvement of the private sector in public gover-
nance, means that increasingly, people do not have the ability to opt out of engaging
with technology firms. At the same time, those firms are increasingly intervening on the
population level in ways that have implications for social and political life. This creates
the potential for power relations of domination, and demands that we decide what
constitutes the legitimacy to act on the public. Business ethics and private law are not
designed to answer these questions, which are primarily political. If people have lost
the right to disengage with commercial technologies, we may need to hold the
companies that offer them to the same standards to which we hold the public sector.
This paper first defines the problem and demonstrates that it is significant and wide-
spread, and then argues for the development of an overarching normative framework
for what constitutes non-domination with regard to digital technologies. Such a frame-
work must involve a nuanced idea of political power and accountability that can
respond not only to the legality of corporate behaviour, but to its legitimacy.
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1 Introduction: the Problem with Data Governance
Datafication poses serious challenges to the way people conceptualise rights and
freedoms around the world. Privacy, justice, fairness and other fundamental values
are being put under pressure by our digitising societies, and much of this process is
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comparable to that of states (Broeders and Taylor 2017), and their political power is
rising to match. This technological power has also become an essential component of
the state’s ability to govern: people’s ability to opt out of using digital technologies for
many of the basic functions of citizenship and public life is diminishing as countries
progress from promoting e-government to depending on commercial technology as
infrastructure for emergency response, national security, border control, education, law
enforcement, and many other public needs (Prins et al. 2012).
This technological entanglement of the private with the public brings the global
technology sector immense political power and with it the potential for domination
(Laborde and Ronzoni 2016; van der Sloot 2018). The political tools we have devel-
oped for controlling this kind of power have not so far been brought to bear on the
private sector, and so far are offering little protection from the population-level
influence they generate in the public and political spheres.
Problems occurring as a result of this kind of domination can be typologised as
follows. First, there are problems arising from contracting. These are cases where
commercial firms develop capacity that is complementary to that of the state and then
become incorporated as contractors in the state’s operations while still retaining a
private-sector identity. One example of the problems this can create is the interaction
between the South African government and the firm Cash Paymaster Services, owned
by the technology firm Net1, for the digital distribution of welfare payments (Foley and
Swilling 2018). CPS became a monopoly provider due to its technical capacity in
electronic transfers and biometric verification, but then exploited both its monopoly and
grant recipients’ poverty by using the data it gathered through service provision to
create a private marketplace in which Net1’s other subsidiaries could market products
and services, making deductions directly from welfare recipients’ welfare accounts.
When CPS was challenged in court and proved to have engaged in corrupt practices,
however, it did not lose its contract due to the necessity of its public function. Foley and
Swilling note ‘the risks which come with the outsourcing of services to the private
sector […] – where a private company attempts to hold the country’s most vulnerable
people hostage and leaving the government with no option but to concede to its
demands.’ This is an example of technology-based power that aligns with the three
characteristics of domination according to Lovett (2010): imbalance of power, depen-
dency and arbitrariness. These are particularly relevant because welfare recipients
cannot say no to the services of a government contractor.
The second way in which technology firms acquire mass influence and leverage
over public attention and engagement is in the style of the multinational technology
giants: independently of government, through people’s engagement with their plat-
forms or services. This mass engagement effectively makes them public service
providers, because their platforms or services can be used to reach particular popula-
tions for political, economic or social purposes. An example of this is the API service
developed in 2020 by Google and Apple to facilitate contact tracing during the Covid-
19 pandemic, where the two firms’ almost complete monopoly on smartphone operat-
ing systems enabled them to channel information about the location of, and contacts
between, almost all the world’s smartphone users to anyone building an app. A second
illustration of this problem is the trend amongst younger US adults toward accessing
political news mainly on social media (Pew 2020), giving social media firms’ algo-
rithms immense power over the topics people become aware of, and how they are
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presented. A third was Facebook’s 2019 proposal to introduce a new digital currency,
Libra, that would operate worldwide based on private-sector networks and backed up
by capital reserves held by private firms. France’s finance minister responded that ‘the
monetary sovereignty of countries is at stake from a possible privatisation of money…
by a sole actor with more than 2 billion users on the planet.’ (Guardian 2019b). This
type of activity by firms demonstrates problems of power, dependence and arbitrari-
ness: firms not only have the ability to act arbitrarily on the mass scale themselves, but
create markets for data and profiles that enable others to act arbitrarily as well, without
scrutiny or accountability. This second type also takes the form of passive intervention
resulting from the design of products and platforms, as for instance when social media
algorithms amplify particular political messages over others in a systematic way, or
change the reach and power of misinformation about public health issues (e.g.
Guardian 2019c).
The third type that can be distinguished is a hybrid one where government allows or
invites technology firms to operate in public space but explicitly refuses to regulate
their activities. Two examples are the UK government’s interaction with Amazon in
2019, and Alphabet subsidiary Sidewalk Labs’ marketing of digital payment and
logistics platforms to cities around the world. In the UK case, the government agreed
in 2019 to give Amazon access to National Health Service data because, according to
Health Secretary Matt Hancock, ‘allow[ing] Amazon Alexa devices to offer expert
health advice to users would reduce pressure on “[…] hard-working GPs and pharma-
cists”’ (Guardian 2019a). Under its agreement with the government, Amazon is
permitted to monetise copyright NHS content, data and materials by using them to
create new products and services, and to share the information with third parties who
may also monetise them, but the NHS receives no compensation and has no control
over the use of its materials by Amazon (Guardian 2019a). Sidewalk Labs provides
digital services to cities in return for all the data stemming from people’s use of public
transport infrastructure, which then enable it to capture more of the service provision
market as well as channelling demand to its preferred partners, such as Uber (Bliss
2019). Other examples are the World Health Organisation’s adoption of WhatsApp for
global public health messaging relating to the Covid-19 pandemic (Devex 2020) and
the EU’s call for data analytics vendors to create migration statistics from big data
sources (Taylor and Meissner 2020).
This hybrid type of engagement starts with a commercial investment in capacity that
results in a monopoly on data about core public services or entitlements. In turn, that
data serves to enable companies to capture new markets and create new products that
lead to lucrative government contracts. This dynamic is also common to commercial
cloud service provision (Gürses and van Hoboken 2017), which started as a byproduct
of the surplus computing capacity beyond that necessary for firms’ operations and has
resulted in large-scale government contracts for those with unused processing power in
their server farms. A 2019 investigation by activist group Mijente found Amazon Web
Services had 204 federal authorisations to maintain government data, followed by
Microsoft with 150, Salesforce with 31, and Google with 27 (Mijente, National
Immigration Project, and Immigrant Defense Project 2019, p. 5).
These problems cannot be remedied within a vision of technology governance that
draws a hard line between commercial and public values and activities. Instead, they
raise questions of exploitation and power on a more general level. I will argue that it is
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specifically the potential for domination that surfaces in relation to such scandals, that
raises the public interest and that requires a new kind of regulatory and political
response, namely one that takes into account the presence of technology corporations
as well as states in the public sphere.
So far, responses to informational capitalism as a governance problem (Castells
2008; Cohen 2017) have taken the form of data protection and the developing field of
data ethics, which have been demonstrated to have limits in their freedom to
problematise and interrogate the political status quo of informational capitalism
(Wagner 2018,Taylor and Dencik 2020). I will argue that if we frame the problem of
regulating technological power as one of non-domination, the notion of legitimacy
becomes a tool to evaluate the extent to which we wish to regulate that power, and how
to approach such regulation. Theories of domination, however, have so far been used to
analyse state rather than corporate behaviour as a threat to freedom (see, for example,
Laborde and Ronzoni 2016; Pettit 2012), despite their utility for thinking about private-
sector action. A notable exception is van der Sloot (2018) who examines how the
European Court of Human Rights’ decisions on digital surveillance cases have shifted
from a focus on interference and harm to a broader logic of domination and arbitrary
power.
This paper aims at two objectives: more closely defining the problem of legitimacy
in relation to the technology sector, and exploring the potential of a non-domination
lens as a way to interrogate the legitimacy of corporate technological intervention.
2 What Is Missing from the Current Regulatory Perspective on Data?
2.1 Understanding of the Public-Private Overlap—What Has Changed?
With the rise of the platform and mobile data economies, states worldwide have
increasingly come to rely on private-sector data to ‘see’ their populations (Scott
1998), and as a result, the private sector is systematically taking on tasks that have
traditionally been the preserve of the state. This reorganisation of activities and
responsibilities with regard to digital data is important not just from the legal or
administrative perspective but because of its political and social effects.
In this paper, I therefore distinguish between the public sector—a functional defi-
nition denoting actors and institutions whose activities take place primarily under the
auspices of government—and the public sphere, where public functions are performed
and matters of public concern are dealt with. In relation to entrepreneurial action with
technology, the public sphere has two important characteristics: first, it is the space
where ‘general’ or ‘population-level’ action can take place—in this case, data-enabled
interventions that potentially affect most, or all people in a country. Second, it is the
space where interventions can be experienced as social and political, and where there is
the possibility of collective understanding and responses. This usage derives broadly
from the work of Dewey (1991 (1927)) and will be discussed further below.
It matters how technology firms engage with public-sector systems, not just for the
formal reason that in most of the world the private and public sector are subject to
different kinds of regulatory scrutiny. Colona and Jaffe (2016) demonstrate that where
hybrid governance arrangements develop, they shape what the state perceives as
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acceptable over the longer term. The interaction between Chinese state authorities and
mobile network operators during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 for example resulted
in various tools for social control which rapidly became part of the apparatus of
everyday Chinese governmental power (The Guardian 2020). This suggests that the
worldwide shifting of public-sector tasks such as public health and law enforcement
onto private-sector actors therefore requires a re-ordering of democratic and regulatory
scrutiny.
Establishing meaningful accountability for the private sector is a particular challenge
in relation to technology. This is partly due to the opacity of many large-scale technical
systems, but also because governments often make an economic argument that such
firms should be protected from public scrutiny. For example, in relation to the NHS-
Amazon data sharing deal, the UK’s Department of Health claimed that the contract
could not be made public because this might ‘prejudice the commercial interests of
Amazon’ (Privacy International 2019). The statement went on to explain that
‘The public interest in the disclosure of the agreement with Amazon is largely
focussed on the issue of sharing personal data. The redacted clauses in the
agreement cover unrelated commercial issues and therefore do not advance the
public understanding of the issue of sharing personal data.’ (ibid)
The Department of Health is making two related claims: first, that Amazon’s commer-
cial interest supersedes the public interest, and second, that the public interest can be
defined narrowly in terms of data protection. If no identifiable personal data is being
shared, the UK government claims, then the public may not question the right of
Amazon to make a profit from their public health service, despite the fact that the NHS
is designed to create public goods, and is sustained entirely by taxation.
How does this kind of public action by technology firms differ from the public-
private partnerships that have become a normal mode of public service provision in
most higher-income countries? This is not merely an alliance that benefits government
and firms, nor is it just another example of the neoliberal state exercising the principles
of New Public Management. Instead, a different type of claim is being made by both
parties involved: that there is no difference between public services provided by
government and by business, despite the profit interests involved and the different
regulatory architectures occupied by firms and government. In the classic PPP model,
firms contract with government in sectors where they already have expertise, with
engineering firms for example contracting to build public infrastructure, and software
companies developing platforms to provide e-government services. In contrast, this
new mode of involvement is based on formerly unrelated capacity (data processing,
cloud storage, analytics) entrepreneurially repurposed to take on public service tasks in
a particular field, but without the ‘implicit values, norms and skills’ that characterise
existing actors in that field (Sharon 2020: 7). Sharon uses both Walzer’s concept of
spheres of justice and the idea of political legitimacy to explain why this new
phenomenon is problematic in the case of Google and Apple’s contact-tracing API:
‘legitimate advantage acquired in the sphere of digital goods— digital expertise—has
been converted into advantages in the sphere of health and medicine (where epidemi-
ological expertise should be the main source of legitimacy), and in the sphere of politics
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(where democratic accountability should be the source of legitimacy)’ (Sharon 2020:
10).
As well as the transgression of spheres of expertise and values, such forced
marriages between private and public also undermine transparency and contestability.
While a lack of public transparency is normal for business contracts, this becomes a
problem when firms undertake the tasks of government. When the EU instigated a
market for migration statistics deriving from big data (EU 2018), vendors rushed in
with projects to track and predict migrants’movements and behaviour, with an eventual
audience of the IOM, Frontex and other border and migration authorities. However, this
contribution to migration policy was just as opaque to the public as the work of Google
and Amazon with public data. A freedom-of-information request to Frontex in 2019,
asking to see documents relating to the Big Data for Migration projects, resulted in a
reply from the organisation’s Transparency Office that
‘Frontex has identified a total of 28 documents. However, access to 27 of those
must be refused […] as their disclosure would undermine the protection of
commercial interests of legal persons. […] As no overriding public interest that
is objective and general in nature and not distinguishable from individual or
private interests for the release of these documents is ascertainable in the present
case, the release of these documents has to be refused.’1
Similarly to the UK’s statement about Amazon, this is a claim that private firms’
activities on public issues must not be defined as public in nature and subjected to
public scrutiny. This claim twists the purpose of data protection, which was originally
conceptualised as a way of protecting democratic rights, regardless of whether states,
firms or both were threatening them (Westin 1967, p. 65). In public administration
terms, where firms formally contract with government, this means that responsibility
and accountability for service provision formally remain with the state, but research
shows that in practice, this tends to be a rhetorical rather than an operational claim since
such functions are not usually highly visible in terms of procurement and execution
(Mulgan 2006).
2.2 Defining What Is Public Technology
Even where they have widespread negative effects on political, social or economic life,
firms tend to be judged according to different standards from government. This is
because firms ‘do not function according to a democratic logic to offset inequalities or
to defend certain rights’ (Elsig and Amalric 2008) unless they are explicitly forced by
government to do so, and moreover because regulation of the private sector is not
designed with public scrutiny in mind. The functional and processual ways of consid-
ering legitimacy common in public administration scholarship, i.e. those of input,
output and throughput legitimacy (Scharpf 2009), are not designed to help think
through the role of firms when they act on the public at scale. Technology firms’
new role fits imperfectly with the theory available, so that the latter needs adapting to
provide traction on private actors acting in public ways.
1 Letter from Frontex Transparency Office to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, London, 14.10.2019.
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One place to start is by locating and defining risk in relation to large-scale techno-
logical interventions. What should be the target of transparency claims—personal data,
or an intervention per se? French administrative law offers one possible approach, as
demonstrated in the 2016 ‘Loi pour une Republique Numerique’. The law names a
category of ‘Données d’intérêt général’ (data of public interest) separately from the
national law on data protection, and stipulates that this category of data must be opened
for public use and the firm appropriately compensated. Although the French law largely
assumes this kind of data will be created through public-private partnerships, it may
open the door to claims to other kinds of data as ‘public’. This assumption that data
becomes a matter for the public and the government (Art. 17),2 rather than the
government and the firm, contrasts explicitly with the UK government’s position on
its Amazon Alexa collaboration, i.e. that a tech firm is entitled to make profits from
public data without being accountable to the public.
2.3 Updating Corporate Legitimacy for the Technology Domain
I have argued above that the constellation of public-private, private and hybrid tech-
nology interventions described above is not simply a new permutation of the public-
private partnership. Instead, technology firms are behaving as autonomous actors with
(in relation to their specific fields of operation) some of the reach and power of
government, and this poses particular and new risks. These include the following:
2.3.1 The Scale and Reach of Corporate Technological Power
The scale and asymmetry of power and information with regard to data technologies—
namely, how much data is being collected and used, the invisibility of that process, and
the scale and depth with which it may be used to intervene on people—has exponen-
tially grown over the last decade. The scale of corporate power over people through
data, combined with the ubiquity of the private sector in the public sphere, means that
increasingly people do not have the ability to opt out of providing their data to firms—
and that states have little option but to turn to technology providers for data on the
public, as could be seen with the Google/Apple API developed in the Covid-19
emergency.
2.3.2 Technological Shaping of Operations of Citizenship
The ways in which populations can be influenced and manipulated through the data
they emit have developed exponentially over the last decades. Corporations project
themselves into the public sphere in ways that have the potential to render democ-
racies fragile and to empower the private sector at the expense of the state—through
establishing independent currencies, intervening in electoral politics, determining
which migrants can be seen and which remain invisible, who goes to jail and who
stays free. These interventions have implications for civil and political rights.
2 Based on Art. 53-1,Ordonnance n° 2016-65 du 29 janvier 2016 relative aux contrats de concession: ‘La
mise à disposition ou la publication des données et bases de données fournies par le concessionnaire se fait
dans le respect des articles L. 311-5 à L. 311-7 du code des relations entre le public et l’administration.’
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Regulation is equipped to counter concrete and visible harms such as false repre-
sentation, unequal treatment, service denial due to inaccurate data and leakages of
personal data. Instead, however, the involvement of big tech on the societal level
creates risks relating to distributed visibility, to chilling effects on speech and
action, to problems of autonomy and generally to slower-moving, multidimensional
problems.
2.3.3 Technology’s Tendency to Create and Amplify Vulnerability
The AI phase of datafication not only brings new types of harm, it also inflicts it
unequally. Eubanks (2018) has explored the ways in which the automation of public
service provision disempowers the poor and vulnerable by removing the personal
knowledge and empathy of social workers from the bureaucratic environment, by
ensuring that errors persist and are passed along the bureaucratic chain of care
provision, and by making it harder for people to correct errors where they are
identified. Kulynych et al. (2020) look at the ways in which algorithm-based optimi-
sation processes disadvantage non-users of technology in the name of participation
(those who use the right devices to communicate their needs become visible at the
expense of those who do not), for example how Uber’s optimisation decreases support
for public transport systems, which in the US affects the mainly lower-income people
who rely on them.
As well as exacerbating inequality, intervention by commercial firms can create
new vulnerability. CPS’s welfare grant distribution contract in South Africa im-
posed both the English language and digital systems on recipients who were unused
to both, marginalising them in new ways and then taking advantage of that
marginalisation as a market for goods and services. Similarly, experimentation with
blockchain and self-sovereign identity projects (ID2020 2019) by technology
vendors on refugees and displaced people create guinea-pig populations who can
both be exploited as new markets and serve as proof-of-concept for market
expansion plans elsewhere.
2.3.4 Lack of Global, Accessible Frameworks for Effective Redress
When commercial systems handle public-sector functions, particularly across national
borders, the link between citizen and authorities is frequently broken. If a Syrian
refugee placed in Lebanon decides that they want to defend themselves from the
possible negative effects of data analytics by the World Food Program (Responsible
Data 2019), they will need to first identify what is being done with their data by a US
partner, Palantir, then make a claim either against that US firm or against the WFP, a
humanitarian body which is legally immune (Boon 2016). To do either, they will need
to go through the Lebanese state, whose data protection law is designed to promote
commerce rather than protect people (SMEX 2018). These problems are part of the
larger structural impunity created by globalisation: as Nancy Fraser points out in her
work on ‘abnormal justice’, ‘in the wake of transnationalized production, globalized
finance, and neoliberal trade and investment regimes, redistribution claims increasingly
trespass the bounds of state-centered grammars and arenas of argument’ (Fraser 2008,
p. 396).
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3 Interrogating Legitimacy as a Route to Non-domination
As argued above, when technology corporations intervene on the public they do so
largely outside the normative and legal frameworks that mediate the power of state
authorities over citizens. If the technology sector continues to evolve toward state-
like functions, this suggests it may need to exist within a more state-like framework.
Given that firms exhibit different levels of state-like behaviour and potential for
political domination, this suggests that regulation should be shaped according to
how state-like and potentially domination-related their actions are in relation to the
public.
Although data protection is usually cited as the key to controlling the power of
technology firms, its underlying premise—the rational, informed, liberal subject—is
vulnerable with respect to the new paradigm of big data and AI. In this new paradigm,
what happens to data after the individual (often unconsciously) generates it is largely
opaque and takes place mainly within corporate architectures. The terms-of-service
information people receive about data’s lifecycle usually refer to ‘research’ and ‘third
parties’ as if this constituted meaningful information based on which people could
exercise rights over their data. Everyday life in the data economy, however, demon-
strates that this kind of control and knowledge are an illusion. Moreover, many of the
forms of data that have the most impact on our lives are inferred or created as
derivatives from data we are aware of, and circulate beyond the reach of our individual
rights (Wachter and Mittelstadt 2019).
While data protection relies heavily on the idea of the ‘legitimate use’ of data, there
has been little debate on its conceptual underpinning. Europe’s GDPR, for example,
cites the idea of ‘legitimate purpose’ as if it were self-evident where the legitimacy to
act using data is sourced. It does not provide guidance on where we should seek the
definition or criteria for what is legitimate and what is not. In the US and other
jurisdictions, there is even less clarity on what constitutes legitimacy. There, data
protection provisions tend to be sector-specific and to address people as consumers
rather than citizens, which leads to framing legitimacy in relation to commercial, rather
than public, interests. If instead we demanded that government take responsibility for
technology firms’ engagement in public functions, the state would find itself in a
position similar to the one it holds in a public-private partnership, and individuals
would not be in the position of having to regulate firms’ actions without the necessary
power. Instead, it would become possible for watchdogs and regulators to push the state
to create conditions of transparency and to limit firms’ engagement to avoid function
creep.
With regard to public authorities’ own data use, the GDPR is specific (in Art.
6(1)(f)) that they must locate the basis of their ‘legitimate use’ in national law; however,
it does not demand this of corporations. This is because the responsibility for making
sure corporations are operating within the law lies with the state (see, for example, the
Ruggie Principles for human rights and business (Ruggie 2011)). However, this
involves no positive obligations, so that if a firm starts taking on the tasks of public
authorities, questions arise about the type of legitimacy involved. For example, if
Amazon starts to intervene in public healthcare provision or in the insurance market
based on its access to public-sector data, it is unclear how people should weigh the
legitimacy of those interventions—on the same basis as government, in which case
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where is the law that allows it to shape public health? Or on the much weaker basis of
its business interests, which do not seem sufficient to bound this scale of power?
In a thin interpretation of legitimacy, a firm should just act within its own mission
and not disobey the law—as the UK government argues Amazon is doing, for instance.
Is this enough though, or do we need to apply a thicker concept of legitimacy so that a
corporation that gains the ability to intervene on the public and affect public goods and
values also becomes subject to the kinds of legitimacy demands made of the state?
We see an alternate framing of corporate (il)legitimacy from constitutional courts in
South Africa and from the Supreme Court in India, where problems of corporate
exploitation of the public through data have forced a consideration of firms’ standing
in relation to the public. In South Africa’s CPS case, the welfare system became
dependent on the technology firm so that even after it was judged to be engaging in
corruption and fraud, its contract was renewed to prevent interruption in the delivery of
welfare grants.3 In formal terms, this legitimised CPS (Foley and Swilling 2018, p. 44)
although the court’s and the petitioners’ statements are clear that this was not the
objective. This aligns with the Indian Supreme Court’s judgement regarding the
possibilities for exploitation inherent in the country’s Aadhaar population data-
base4—by the time the case came to judgement the activity of the company had
become inseparable from the responsibility of the state to its citizens, influencing the
judiciary to leave a system in place, despite agreeing it had the potential for exploitation
and domination.
3.1 Thickening the Concept of Corporate Legitimacy
Political philosophy perspectives on legitimacy have centred on the relations between
states and their citizens. The domain of business ethics has more recently addressed the
question of how corporations can claim legitimacy, at first with a focus on the
economic relationship between corporations and society (e.g. Epstein 1972). It is worth
briefly engaging with the business literature on empirical legitimacy in order to address
the argument that we do not need a normative legitimacy framework for corporations in
the public sphere and that instead we can rely on them to determine for themselves the
values they will uphold, independently of the public.
In the 2000s, as globalisation accelerated, researchers started to question the idea
that corporations could set their own criteria for legitimacy. Palazzo and Scherer (2006)
chart how issues such as multinational firms’ labour practices in low-income countries,
or the violation of environmental rights, have in the past generated challenges that had
to be answered in the political, rather than purely the economic, sphere. Building on
this, Demuijnck and Fasterling (2016) posit two categories of corporate legitimacy.
First, that a firm is normatively legitimate if it can be supposed that people would
approve of its entire business model and practices, if they were fully informed of them.
Second, that it can be empirically considered legitimate if it is popularly perceived to be
so. The important factor here is whether people are informed about what the firm is
doing: the authors warn that this empirical legitimacy may depend on ‘some informa-
tion [being] hidden or misrepresented so that people can be manipulated’ (ibid, 678).
3 Black Sash Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others, 2017, ZACC 8
4 Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 & connected matters, 2018, Supreme Court of India
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These paper-thin concepts of legitimacy are particularly unsatisfying because the ways
in which technology firms monetise data are hidden from the public. In order to make
personal choices on the everyday level with respect to personal autonomy and liberty,
people also need meaningful information on the overall business model they are
engaging with. This necessitates a thicker concept of legitimacy against which to test
business purposes, if we are not to legitimise anything a corporation chooses to put in
its mission and then enact on the public.
Classic theories on legitimacy are of limited help here because they deal with
different concerns. Firms do not, for instance, (usually) claim coercive political author-
ity, meaning that the coercive power that has been the focus of political philosophies of
legitimacy, starting with Rousseau, may not be the most relevant framing when we
think of the private sector. Technology firms are not attempting to conscript citizens, to
go to war or (directly) to conduct coups. Instead, we see them claiming a passive kind
of political legitimacy, namely that they may explore activities that have traditionally
been those of the state while remaining shielded from public scrutiny as purely for-
profit actors. There is an important difference between this type of activity and
government procurement, or the purposeful privatisation of public services and infra-
structure. In these cases, it is clear that we should hold the government responsible for
the outcomes of privatisation. There is also a difference between firms using open data
that is accessible to anyone. The political legitimacy problem belongs to a still-
emerging middle ground that allows firms with particular reach and power to become
quasi-governmental actors while still claiming to be merely doing business.
The cases where we might want to require a thicker version of legitimacy from firms
can be grouped into particular types of function. First, sorting and categorising citizens
for purposes of population-level intervention. Second, activities that have large-scale
impacts on fundamental rights such as free speech and freedom of association; for
example social media platforms which must decide whether to allow misinformation to
be publicised or controversial interest groups to be organised in online space. Finally,
we might pay attention to firms’ activities that constitute information policy usually
undertaken by government (for example on public health, law enforcement or emer-
gency information services).
4 Corporate Authority and Public Consent
Debates on the nature and foundations of legitimacy take two directions. One, origi-
nating with Weber (1918), is based on the notion of effective authority, i.e. that an actor
is judged legitimate if people accept its authority and agree they should obey its
commands. An alternate perspective on legitimacy holds that an actor may be judged
legitimate if its power is understood by people as justified; Raz, in particular, links this
type of legitimacy to the justification of authority (Raz 1986). According to him, people
may obey an actor for one of two reasons: either because they have effective authority
(for example, a first-aider asking people to stand back when someone is taken ill in the
street), or because their authority is based on legitimacy and therefore need not be
weighed in the same way (for example, a firefighter asking people to leave their homes
because their neighbourhood is at risk). The first case does not preclude disagreement
and resistance: for example, if I were a doctor, I might not want to stand back but
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instead step in and take over authority. In the second case, I would be unlikely to refuse
to leave my house regardless of my opinion of the level of risk involved.
The distinction between these two types of authority is important to the issue of
corporations in the public sphere because it enables us to ask what kind of authority
is being exercised or obeyed. Should we address Facebook, for instance, as a
political actor claiming the legitimate authority to allow or disallow particular kinds
of speech, or as a business with merely effective control over its users’ behaviour? It
matters which we choose because they lead to different routes of action, the first in
the political sphere and the second in the sphere of regulation, for example through
data protection or competition law. It is hard, however, to argue solely for the latter,
and practice seems to bear this out: although data protection and competition law
are clearly the main practical tools available if we wish to limit the firm’s power, its
management is increasingly being called to account by state authorities because of
its political effects.
It matters to this discussion what kind of political effects a firm is generating. In the
case of privatisation, political effects can effectively be channelled back to the govern-
ment: if, for example, a rail provider runs the trains late or dangerously, this will have
political repercussions for the ministry responsible for privatising the network while the
firm itself will experience primarily regulatory repercussions with the aim of restoring
service to the public. In contrast when technology firms create new systems or
applications, rather than contracting to serve a specific public need, they are carving
out possibilities for engagement and profit in the public realm. This raises the question
of how the public should and can engage with any problems firms’ actions create:
indirectly through government in the form of regulation and law, or directly through
cooperation or its withdrawal.
If we wish to find a thick enough conceptualisation of firms as political actors, and
the relation of public consent to that role, we may look to contractarian philosophers
such as Hampton, whose definition of morally legitimate political authority distin-
guishes between ‘convention consent’ where people may cooperate with an authority
even though they find it unjust because they see no reasonable alternative to it, and
‘endorsement consent’ where people agree with the authority on a moral basis and
therefore find cooperation justified (Hampton 1997, pp. 100, 112). This distinction can
also be found in Rawls’ articulation of ‘joining consent’ as opposed to ‘originating
consent’ (Rawls 2008, p. 124).
The notion of consent, and the kind of relationship within which consent can take
place, is relevant because of the frequent misuse of the notion of consent in relation to
technology. With the South African example of CPS as welfare distributor, for
example, welfare claimants became ‘users’ and had to give consent to the firm to use
their data, a process that effectively replaces the consent of the citizen to be governed
by the state and to receive entitlements as part of that relationship. In this case,
imposing the hollowed-out version of consent demanded of users of commercial
technology is the epitome of forced cooperation. Evidence of this hollowing-out of
consent is provided by Draper and Turow’s research on people’s relationship with
technology firms in the USA: the authors find that people believe ‘available responses
are meaningless in the face of various manifestations of corporate power’, and that this
‘prevents individual frustration from being transformed into collective anger that might
encourage institutional change’ (Draper and Turow 2019, pp. 1834–5).
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We can connect the kind of hollowing-out of consent that occurs in the realm of
commercial technology with the hollowed-out political consent Hampton warns is
problematic because it is used as a way of coopting resistance and preserving the status
quo:
‘[the state] allows people to withdraw their consent, at regular intervals, from
particular persons holding power and particular rules or offices in the regime,
even while keeping them within the overall political structure of the regime. It is
therefore a system of political authority that attempts to maximize the convention
consent it receives from residents of a territory by providing politically acceptable
avenues for those residents to rebel against aspects of its operation.’ (Hampton
1997, p. 107)
We can see this in action if we look at privacy campaigner Max Schrems’ 2015 victory
against Facebook. Schrems claimed the ‘Safe Harbour’ law allowing companies to
transfer data about EU citizens to the US, and in turn to US intelligence authorities,
violated his fundamental right to privacy. The Court of Justice of the European Union
found in his favour5 and struck down the law. It was, however, replaced by a similar
law, ‘Privacy Shield’, which then proved to be merely a figleaf under which identically
illegal transfers could continue (Guardian 2020).
On one hand, evidence of meaningful consent would be important to consider.
Before we assume that we need to guard ourselves from domination by technology
firms, we should check the arguments to the contrary. What if technology firms are
justified in arguing that their contribution to the public sphere outweighs any problems
they cause? Given how readily states are giving up their power to corporations, and
those corporations’ strong arguments for their contribution to the public good (Taylor
2016), we should consider this too. If this narrative is the right one, then we might
expect it to be generating evidence of real consent. What endorsement consent might
look like in relation to corporate activities remains an open question however, given the
evidence presented by Draper and Turow that actively using a firm’s products or
services may denote unhappy resignation rather than agreement with its business
model. On the other hand, if convention consent is what we currently see with regard
to the role of technology firms in the public sphere, and if contestation within the
existing framework is not a meaningful option since states are protecting the interests of
corporations as their own, this suggests that domination is an appropriate framing for
the problem of technological power.
The problem of domination has long been discussed both by liberal philosophers
and in critiques of globalisation. Laborde and Ronzoni (2016, p. 279) argue that the
power of multinational corporations inevitably gives rise to domination—which they
define as ‘subjection to the arbitrary power of another actor’—on the state level. These
corporations’ power makes them rule-makers and the states where they operate rule-
takers, decreasing public control over them. The authors describe how ‘transnational
private actors […] exercise arbitrary power over crucial aspects of domestic institu-
tional settings’ and ‘not only do domestic institutions have limited means to resist the
phenomenon; they are also often themselves pressurised into modifying their own
5 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 2015.
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policies, thus being undermined both in their problem-solving capacity and in their
accountability to their own citizens.’ (ibid, p. 282). This seems, on the whole, a fair
description of the current state of the technology sector as a global actor in the various
fields where it operates.
4.1 The (Technologically Mediated) Sphere of Public Reason
If we wish to understand the problem of domination, and why user consent is not an
answer to it, we must ask whether disengagement is possible. The large-scale involve-
ment of the private sector in datafication challenges assumptions about the link between
what is population-wide and what is public. Dewey (1991) writes that any policy-scale
intervention has the side-effect of creating a public who can then contest it. The view of
Lukes (2004 (1974), p. 20) adds nuance to this by arguing that issues have to acquire a
specific public in order to be dealt with, and if they do not, they will not be addressed.
To use Lukes’ logic, if businesses are shaping and even initiating policy interventions,
but the technology used to do so has already been introduced and normalised as
something innocuous (such as a social network or a digital assistant, for example), it
may be harder for new uses of that technology to become perceived as problematic and
thus to become an issue that acquires a public to debate it.
This question is important given that technology firms mediate exactly the processes
of public reasoning that are usually understood to characterise legitimate action. As it
becomes less possible to disengage from certain technologies, this creates a monopoly
problem where the public can only see the world as it is presented by particular actors.
This is not a new problem: Dewey identified it in the 1920s when he observed that
‘Industry and inventions in technology, for example, create means which alter the
modes of associative behavior and which radically change the quantity, character
and place of impact of their indirect consequences. […] These changes are
extrinsic to political forms, which, once established, persist of their own momen-
tum. The new public which is generated remains inchoate, unorganized, because
it cannot use inherited political agencies. The latter, if elaborate and well institu-
tionalized, obstruct the organization of the new public. … To form itself, the
public has to break existing forms (Dewey 1991 [1927]: 30–31).
This problem of ‘inherited political agencies’ evokes the questions raised by large-scale
influence over public discourse on the part of firms. When political communication is
mediated by commercial algorithms, our understanding of the meaning and effects of
the incursions of technology firms into the public sphere is also inevitably shaped by
them, just as Dewey describes.
Scholars such as van Dijck (2012) and Helberger (2019) ask how we should regulate
the algorithmically mediated public sphere and what criteria we should use to evaluate
whether active participation in society is still possible in the presence of commercial
interventions. Should they be addressed as a political and economic phenomenon that
must be shaped in the offline political domain, or should we instead engage with the
technology through techno-regulation to shape its effects? Which would produce ‘more
accountable relations’ between the powerful who use data and those upon whom it is
used? (Daigle and Ramírez 2019) Even if we find a way to reconcile these two
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approaches, it still matters what we believe ‘the public sphere’ to be. If no one can
perceive it other than through the prism of data technologies, we should take into
account that this intermediation has a short-circuiting effect on people’s ability to
decide what kind of consent, if any, they might give to the presence of these firms in
the public sphere.
Dewey argued in 1927 that the body politic had to remain the answer to this
problem. Policy interventions, he pointed out, are seldom clearly visible to those
directly affected, and ‘[since the] supervision and regulation [of these consequences]
cannot be effected by the primary groupings themselves[…] consequently special
agencies and measures must be formed if they are to be attended to’ (Dewey 1991
[1927], pp. 15–16). A public must make sense of new interventions and respond to
those conducting them, regardless of whether individuals can perceive them clearly or
not. Dewey’s ‘special agencies and measures’ are the question here: what would it take
for a public to be able to form around, understand and respond to data-enabled harms
and risks on the collective level?
Fraser (1990, p. 66) helps answer this question by orienting us toward more
inclusive representation that takes account of ‘subaltern counter-publics’. This notion
of multiple publics is important in understanding how the social contract with regard to
data currently works. Rather than a single ‘we’ who volunteer our data for purposes of
governance or commerce, in reality that transaction may be consensual and reciprocal
for some groups (for instance in relations between elites and government) and simul-
taneously oppressive and intolerable for others within the same society (for example
indigenous groups, the incarcerated, or welfare recipients’ relationships with those who
categorise and sort them through data technologies). In the South African case of CPS,
for example, while some welfare recipients may be well served by digitising provision
others will have language difficulties with services provided in English and without
adequate user support. If those groups become represented, the ability of CPS to serve
the public adequately becomes contestable and with it, the decision to move service
provision to a private online provider.
This fuller engagement with the public may provide a route to greater legitimacy,
but does not solve the problem of domination. Not all publics are created equal, and
many of the people who can best identify problems of domination with regard to data
technologies are in situations of structural exclusion that cannot be solved by efforts at
inclusion. One high-profile example of such a group, explored in the next section, is the
subjects of humanitarian action, who are increasingly a population of interest and
experimentation for technology firms.
4.2 Case Example: Humanitarian Data
The humanitarian domain presents a hard case for understanding the legitimacy of
datafied intervention by businesses for two reasons. First, because international hu-
manitarian organisations have privileges and immunities that insulate them from most
legal challenges (Boon 2016), making it hard to use legality as a basis for claiming
legitimacy. Second, because the populations they assist are excluded from deliberative
processes where they can represent their own interests and have them recognised
(Fraser 2008). Yet they are increasingly the subjects of technological experiments
involving commercial partner organisations who are also involved in mass surveillance
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(Responsible Data 2019), identity technologies (Newsweek 2019) and other technolo-
gies at the public-private intersection.
The humanitarian sector has begun to debate a bioethics-informed approach to data
governance that treats the subjects of humanitarian assistance as able to give or
withdraw their consent like other populations. Anna Kondakhchyan of the Cash
Learning Partnership, which aims to manage the introduction of financial technologies
into refugee service provision, asks:
‘how do we turn “informed consent” from a tick box on a screen during
registration into a meaningful process, respectful of people’s rights to privacy
and protection? How can we ensure that affected populations understand how
their data will be used, and are reassured that it won’t be mistreated by the third
parties with whom we work? And what should we do if we learn that the third
party we have chosen to work with uses programme participant personal infor-
mation to either sell them unwanted services, or worse still, refuse certain
potentially beneficial services to this group?’ (Kondakhchyan 2019)
The last question seems to answer the previous two: if individuals engaging with public
technologies are asked to consent to the monetisation of that engagement, and if the
humanitarian partner cannot guarantee that its private-sector partner will not behave
according to the same principles as it does itself, informed consent is not possible and
instead we find hollowed-out consent that should not be taken as conferring legitimacy,
and may instead be taken as a signal that the potential for domination is present. This is
indeed the case, given that firms partnering with humanitarian organisations remain
independent and do not adopt the mission and principles on which the sector’s effective
legal immunity is based. On that basis, informed consent on the part of the population is
neither relevant nor possible, and other criteria for legitimacy must be sought.
It is this search for legitimacy that characterises the other strand of thinking in the
field. In 2018, the Signal Program, a human rights group developing data technologies
for the humanitarian field, published the Signal Code (Campo et al. 2018). The Code
examines the basis for translating the established legitimating basis of humanitarian
organisations into the new partnerships and collaborations occurring around data.
Rather than assume that the involvement of data analytics in humanitarian action is a
given and asking how to legitimise it, the authors set out in detail the core obligations of
the field and the ‘humanitarian standards and related ethical, moral, and legal frame-
works’ on which the field’s legitimacy is based. The Code returns continually to the
fundamental obligation of humanitarian organisations to answer the needs of affected
populations, warning that
‘The use of information and ICTs do not become humanitarian by virtue of their
use by humanitarians. For these activities to qualify as humanitarian, they must be
designed and executed to uphold the humanitarian principles. An information
activity is only humanitarian if its aim is to prevent and alleviate suffering, protect
life and health, and ensure respect for the individual.’ (Campo et al. 2018, p. 18)
This framework starts from the position of Raz (1986), namely that an authority gains
legitimacy by serving the people. At no point does the Code inquire as to the legitimacy
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of the technological partners becoming involved in humanitarian action. Instead, the
authors focus as comprehensively and forcefully as possible on the requirements and
obligations of the field in relation to affected people in order to address what is
legitimate and what is not. This effectively makes humanitarian organisations fully
responsible for the actions of any for-profit actors in the humanitarian sphere: if they
are intervening, the intervention is that of the humanitarian, not of the firm. There is no
difference in the requirements of transparency, accountability and ethics regardless of
the originator of an intervention: if it is occurring under the auspices of the humanitar-
ian sector, there is one standard.
This case highlights the entanglement between consent and legitimacy in relation to
large-scale interventions. If consent is not possible, as it is not where people have no
chance to withdraw from the intervention, and if the intervention is all-encompassing
for its subjects, then the relationship is inevitably one of domination and in order to
minimise it, those conducting that intervention—including technological partners—
must demonstrate their legitimacy. If they are not accountable to those they are
intervening upon, they require something else, for example a humanitarian mission to
justify their actions. A business case is not sufficient to make any claim to legitimacy,
particularly in the absence of meaningful accountability. Now that corporations are
partnering with humanitarian organisations, there is a debate emerging about whether
they can be shielded by those organisations’ unique privileges and immunities given
that their mission is profit, not humanitarian action (Responsible Data 2019). There is a
similar question for firms doing the work of government: if their mission does not align
with that of government, they cannot borrow the government’s legitimacy. Instead,
other guarantees of good behaviour, such as public accountability, must correspond-
ingly be ensured.
5 (Re)Formulating Accountability for Technology Firms
British politician Tony Benn recommended asking five questions of powerful people or
institutions: ‘What power have you got? Where did you get it from? In whose interests
do you exercise it? To whom are you accountable? And how can we get rid of you?’
(Benn 2001). His questions were intended as a test for a democratic system, but
(following Shaw and Graham (2017)) they are worth translating into questions for
technology firms working in the public sphere. If so, they might consist of the
following:
1. How does your technology affect people at scale?
2. Are your actions bounded by an articulated purpose?
3. Are you accountable for your effects at scale?
4. Are your contracts and assignments transparent to, and contestable by, the public?
5. Is your involvement in the sector time-limited?
If a firm lacks public accountability for its actions when they impact the public, then all
the other questions become irrelevant because the firm, rather than the public, gets to
define the answers. Demanding legitimacy of technological power in the public sphere
therefore means paying close attention to how the benchmarks and criteria for
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accountability are set—is a partnership structured so that it can be rolled back if it is
demonstrated to be against the public interest? Are risk assessments dealing with a
technology’s broader effects accessible by default to public authorities and to the
public?6 And is accountability channelled toward bureaucracy, where independence
from government exists but response may not be seen as urgent, or government, which
may be more responsive but also may be involved as a collaborator in the problem?
To return to the domination framing of this problem, multinational firms gain
arbitrary power by the sheer extent of data they have access to, which allows them to
change their focus at will—Google can transform from a search engine into running
urban transport systems; Palantir can pivot from predictive policing to planning aid
logistics for 92 million beneficiaries. Scrutinising the political legitimacy of these
firms’ activities is one of few effective ways to regulate their accumulation of arbitrary
power because the more successful they are at the public intervention, the less possible
it becomes for the public to ‘get rid of them’, in Benn’s immortal phrasing, and the less
likely it becomes that their engagement will be fixed in its duration. The greater
freedom a firm has to do business within a country’s regulatory framework, the shakier
its claim to legitimacy becomes.
Two avenues to corporate accountability currently exist. One is that government has
the responsibility to keep business within the law, so firms’ accountability could be
seen as flowing to some extent through government. The other is the idea that
consumer choices should regulate the market, and people should stop using firms
which have negative effects on society. However, these two forms of accountability
in fact have the effect of blunting each other. Government’s responsibility for firms’
compliance is only activated if they do something illegal, and the scope of this
responsibility does not include firms’ inclination to act in the public interest. Con-
sumers’ ability to vote with their feet, while relevant if they are using a business’s
platform or services voluntarily, does not apply if that business is acting on them as a
member of society. In this case, they are no longer consumers but merely part of the
affected population—something that places a different kind of responsibility on busi-
nesses not to do harm. This disjuncture in accountability architectures is a serious
problem from a legitimacy point of view because it points only at specific and visible
actions, and away from firms’ most serious and far-reaching effects on society—the
datafied power that allows them to intervene at will in different sectors, and thus risks
domination.
However, neither of these mechanisms has so far successfully dammed the power of
technology giants. Instead, the perceived risks of new technologies are being answered
by incorporating technology firms into governance architectures as decision-makers
and standard-setters. The EU’s High-Level Group on AI Ethics involved 52 members, a
majority of whom were corporate representatives (AI HLEG 2019), and produced
recommendations that lacked any ‘red lines’ for activities where the use of AI was
not permissible.7 In another example, the UK government’s ‘AI procurement guide’
was designed in 2019 in a process led by the World Economic Forum—a group formed
to advance the interests of the world’s largest corporations—with contributions from
6 Data protection impact assessments (DPIAs) are not open by default, and are only conveyed to data
protection authorities in the case of a high-risk self-classification.
7 A penultimate draft of the AI HLEG guidelines did contain ‘red lines’ for unacceptable uses of AI.
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‘fellows’ from UK Government’s Office of AI, but also the firms Deloitte, Salesforce
and Splunk on an equal basis to the UK government (World Economic Forum 2019).
Unsurprisingly, the guidelines resulting from the UK process stress the industry-
friendly notion of ‘output-based requirements’, which allow policy problems such as
homelessness and public health spending to be framed as analytics problems which
benefit from formalisation and optimisation, rather than political ones that require
debate and collective input from society (Kulynych et al. 2020).
5.1 Targeting Accountability
Mechanisms for accountability require content. It is hard to escape the recent technical
discussions of algorithmic fairness in relation to public-sector work (see, from very
different perspectives, Angwin et al. 2016; Monetary Authority of Singapore 2019; UK
Government 2019). However, as Keyes et al. (2019) demonstrate, the technology sector
has tended to pursue a hollowed-out, thin conception of fairness that lacks moral
content as well as social or political context. Although using fairness as one criterion
for legitimacy has the potential benefit of forcing a connection between the technical
and social debates on the issue (Selbst et al. 2019), it is unlikely that this would end
with a meaningful improvement in accountability on the part of government for the
actions of technology firms.
Gürses and Dobbe (2020) offer an alternative by centering on the democratic
challenge of making private digital infrastructures accountable when they take over
and optimise public infrastructural functions:
‘AI frameworks promote reformulating social welfare functions as a problem that
can be optimized computationally rather than solved through the complex con-
sideration and negotiation of human experience and expertise, shielding the
management of infrastructures from democratic forms of control. How can public
interest be assured when it is submitted to these economic terms?’
The authors suggest that instead of looking at individual firms and activities, we use the
outsourcing of infrastructure development in particular sectors to ask questions about
‘computational infrastructure’s relationship to the demands of global capital’ and that
we tie these questions to states’ democratic accountability for their engagement with the
global economic system. Doing this would go beyond demanding accountability for
particular actions and instead demand that states answer for their decision to invite in
global technology firms as infrastructure-building actors in the first place. This ap-
proach assumes that global capital will extract rents wherever it touches down, and that
the only source of democratic accountability is between people and the governments
that decide to invite it in. Bringing criteria together: a framework for legitimacy.
Legitimacy is a problem of both local and global governance. Without the country
level any legal or normative frameworks for action become procedurally unrealistic
ways to seek redress on the individual level, or to work against domination on the
political level, but without situating some demands and enforcement on the
international level, there is no traction possible on multinationals. The challenge
overall is to build a basis for what Lindahl (2018, p. 46) terms ‘institutionalised and
authoritatively mediated collective action’ that is based in discussions amongst and
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between existing publics but that can also have effect across national boundaries. It is
only by solving this problem that we can arrive at a system for seeking endorsement
consent (Hampton 1997) from the public to technological intervention, and that allows
us to take meaningful steps to prevent the wielding of arbitrary power by the technol-
ogy sector.
In order to make it possible for people to give, or withdraw, endorsement consent,
we need to first link deliberative processes with bodies designed to mediate and control
power over the public, and then bring technology firms under the purview of those
bodies. This leads us toward law and regulation, including bodies such as public
watchdog organisations, parliamentary committees, national data regulators and
sector-specific commissions. Given that the task is to hold states to account for
regulating corporate behaviour at a new scale, we are in need of institutions that are
independent and robust to economic and political pressure, and that can respond to all
the stages of a given application of technology—proposed, planned and operational.
The global administrative law movement may hold some answers in relation to the
actions of firms, since it espouses the idea that states have to be accountable for, or
meaningfully hold accountable, non-state organisations (Kingsbury et al. 2005).
Connecting the governance of (technological) corporate action to this agenda may be
an appropriate given the international reach and character of many technology firms
and the issues they generate. Second, to provide the direction for this kind of regulation,
states would have to foster a free and plural debate on what is just with regard to data,
including how to balance economic with social imperatives. For this to happen, other
types of institution need to be involved—think tanks and activist organisations, acade-
mia and funders.
Such an institutional and structural approach needs to be complemented by a
strategy of paying attention to the effects of technologies on the public. Pagallo
(2017) connects the notion of secondary (i.e. procedural) law to legitimacy with his
analysis of the Japanese government’s policy on new technologies such as robotics:
marking out experimental zones for scientists and the public to engage with them and to
test out whether the controls and boundaries on the science of robotics are empirically
adequate. Unforeseen challenges can be addressed with the rules and laws already
available, or may be found to necessitate new ones. This combination of attending to
procedures for safety and to the public’s response to a new technological intervention
can be seen as a form of public discussion and effectively constitutes one type of
strategy for determining legitimacy: if robots become perceived as a positive addition to
society, they will receive endorsement consent. If not, the experiment can be rolled
back.
This procedural approach partially addresses the typology of problems outlined at
the start, of public-private, private and hybrid technology interventions. The first—
where they contract to provide new digital models for public service provision—might
be answered by the deliberation-through-practice approach taken in Japan. So might the
third type, the hybrid model of engagement where a firm provides public informational
infrastructure on an entrepreneurial basis. In this case, though, this would require
engagement by the state in creating deliberative processes that might restrict the actions
of the company in question—something states have not so far shown themselves
willing to do. The second type of problem, the spontaneous corporate capture of
particular functions in the public sphere, is the most intractable because it involves
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firms acting entirely unilaterally. Instead, this would require this type of capture to be
scrutinised systematically by dedicated authorities charged with protecting the public
interest, with regular reporting to insert the findings into deliberative processes. This
kind of scrutiny might be performed by a coalition of a public watchdog and relevant
civil society organisations, but would need to be formalised and funded rather than
made the responsibility of activists.
In a legitimacy-based approach to technology regulation, technology may not need
not be the primary focus: as Peña Gangadharan and Niklas (2019) argue, the problems
of the data economy are not new. Just as the incursion of robotics into social space
provokes discussion about employment, healthcare, public safety and education, dis-
cussions of other technologies in social space will bring up social and political rather
than purely technological or regulatory questions. Economic and informational power
asymmetries, issues of autonomy, rights and representation—all these are existing
social justice issues that already provoke public response. We have to link ‘technolog-
ical citizenship’, as the Rathenau Institute terms it (Rathenau Institute 2018), which
‘emancipates the regular citizen in relation to the experts and developers of technolo-
gy’, with everyday citizenship and with questions of social justice. Many of the
challenges attributed to ‘technological citizenship’ involve regulating capitalism, some-
thing we already have the tools and experience to do, learned from the challenges of
regulating other domains such as financial markets and the energy sector. The chal-
lenge is to bring these lessons to bear in the presence of the siren song of innovation
and corporate power.
6 Conclusions
The current challenges of governing technology demonstrate that data policy is not
only economic policy: it is social policy that belongs in the political sphere. We can see
this from the failure of efforts to confine data governance to data protection law and
data ethics, which have resulted in a model which relies heavily on self-regulation and
ad hoc enforcement. During the 2010s, we saw much emphasis being placed on ethics
commissions and guidelines as actual regulatory instruments rather than consultative
bodies, with the assumption that experts advising on a general level in advance of any
application. Implicitly, the current architecture also places huge demands on rights
organisations, who find themselves in the role of policing violations without the firm-
level access to pre-empt those violations, or the institutional heft to prosecute them. The
inefficiency of this model means that in practice most of the burden to report serious
violations rests on individual whistleblowers, who then bear the full weight of firms’
response on behalf of society. It is not realistic to expect most people to sacrifice their
careers and often their personal safety to fulfil a function that should be pre-emptively
performed up by the only actor powerful enough to stop corporations taking harmful
action—the state.
The first step in establishing meaningful accountability would be to make govern-
ment explicitly responsible for what happens to data with effects on the population
level, and to establish that no matter who is handling it, they are subject to some form of
public scrutiny. This might mean on the country level, for instance, that corporations
cannot act on the population without experiencing the kinds of checks and balances that
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attend state action. In the case of corporate collaborators with international organisa-
tions, we may need think of accountability as layered and mutually reinforcing, where
the receiving country government and the humanitarian organisation both have to
appoint monitoring and enforcement bodies to check each other’s actions on the most
vulnerable. This perspective also has implications for the new phenomenon of direct
development interventions in lower-income countries by technology corporations
(Taylor and Broeders 2015): checks and balances would have to be imposed in the
country of the intervention, meaning that institutions would have to be developed
which would allow developing countries to check corporate power.
There are several possible objections to the approach proposed here. One relates to
its inapplicability in authoritarian contexts where the state itself is not concerned with
legitimacy. If the state is not interested in guarding the interests of its people against
corporate power, no legitimacy-based approach is possible. There are a minority of
states where this would fully apply, however, given that even authoritarian govern-
ments are faced with some need to justify their power. Some of the most visible
problems of technology in the public sphere occur in authoritarian states, however,
with the new power of data technologies only adding to the ability of powerful elites to
suppress resistance and exert control. In cases of limited statehood, such as developing
democracies, a legitimacy approach has the potential to serve as a political tool for
governments to exert power over international interests, as in the example of develop-
ment interventions by multinationals—but it has little to offer citizens of genuinely
authoritarian states. Instead, public resistance must first address the problem of author-
itarianism itself.
A second objection might be that individual consent is the best way to avoid
exploitation where technology firms engage in large-scale action in relation to the
public—and in fact is preferable in a liberal context. This is the argument used in the
case of CPS in South Africa described above. However, where technology firms are
involved, genuine consent on the basis of understanding the business model and
choosing to engage with it inevitably becomes collapsed into the idea of ‘user consent’,
a hollowed-out version that has only the most superficial relationship with the political
notion of consent and which should not be seen as conferring legitimacy.
A final objection is that corporations already have a responsibility and an interest in
behaving ethically, and that they will not survive if they do not. This may be true in the
case of neighbourhood firms which are seen and scrutinised by those they serve. But
the transnational nature of the technology economy, the immense and largely invisible
power conferred by collecting vast quantities of data on the majority of the world’s
population, and the intense competition amongst technology giants and resulting
pressure from shareholders to grow exponentially, removes any incentive or even
ability on the part of large firms to understand the effects of their actions at scale.
A governance architecture based on demanding thick forms of legitimacy holds the
promise of demanding democratic innovation. First, it would constitute the application
of the precautionary principle where new applications of technology at population scale
are concerned. Second, it would demand a very different accountability relationship
between government (or international organisations) and corporations, where transpar-
ency would become radically more important in contracting. Third, it would require the
development of new transparency processes where the government made the nature and
workings of corporate engagements with public data more visible to the public, and of
L. Taylor
new fora for discussion on the national and international levels, providing a stimulus to
the growth of international civil society.
An important feature of the governance processes discussed here is that they are
dynamic and responsive: they must be able to continually interrogate and respond to the
effects of technology within society. Devising ways to interrogate the legitimacy of
corporate technological intervention seems a problem of ‘staying with the trouble’
(Haraway 2016) of relating classic theories to contemporary realities of globalisation
and transnational practices, and of adapting or rethinking theory for different types of
state and social contract. Above all, it means taking into account the new power of
technology, and testing the legitimacy of that power against the demands of justice.
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